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state tax notes®
The Future of SALT: A Broader Picture
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske

David Gamage is a professor of law at
Indiana University Maurer School of Law and
Darien Shanske is a professor at the University
of California, Davis, School of Law (King Hall).
In this edition of Academic Perspectives on
SALT, Gamage and Shanske outline five ways
the federal government could reform the state
and local tax deduction.
The federal tax system interacts with state
systems in many ways, but the state and local tax
deduction — one of the largest points of interface
— is perhaps the most susceptible to direct
1
analysis. There has been much theorizing as to
how best to structure the SALT deduction.
However, because of the limitations of tax politics,
the assumption has long been that the SALT
deduction could only be changed glacially or by
subterfuge — or by both (consider the effects of
2
the alternative minimum tax). The 2017 federal
tax legislation, however, changed the SALT
deduction dramatically. Specifically, for taxpayers

who still itemize, the deduction is now capped at
$10,000 for a combination of property and income
3
(or sales) taxes.
Much of the critical attention has been on how
states could and should respond to this cap —
particularly those with many taxpayers who will
pay more because of it. Here, we will consider the
question from a somewhat different perspective.
The changes to the SALT deduction indicate that
further amendment might be possible. Indeed, to
the extent that this change is unpopular in large
parts of the county and set to expire, there will
likely be another reform opportunity. We elect not
to delve too deeply into why Congress passed the
changes that it did, but as we will soon show, these
changes are not consistent with any theory as to
what the SALT deduction is or should be. To this
end, we will canvas some such theories to
consider how future reforms might proceed;
inevitably, we will also offer thoughts on how
SALT reform should have gone the first time.
Approach One:
Reform Based on Income Tax Principle
The SALT deduction is a long-standing
component of the federal income tax, but its
merits on income tax principles have long been
contested. If state and local services represent a
consumption good, such as paying for a fancy
dinner, then there is no justification for the SALT
deduction at all based on income tax principles.4
Indeed, this is why special benefit assessments,
payments to governments for specific benefits, are
not deductible.5 But if one conceives state and
local taxes as a total loss, making the taxpayer
3

1

See generally Kirk Stark, “The Federal Role in State Tax Reform,” 30
Virginia Tax Review 407 (2010).
2

The touchstone for this assumption was the story of how the SALT
deduction survived tax reform in 1986. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Alan
S. Murray, “Showdown at Gucci Gulch,” 113–14 (1987).

IRC 164(b)(6).

4

Louis Kaplow, “Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and
Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax,” Virginia Law Review (Apr.
1996).
5

Treas. Reg. section 1.164–4.
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unambiguously worse off, then there is a good
argument for the deduction on income tax
grounds. Clearly, the truth is somewhere in
between these two extremes.
Accordingly, one way to think of the new
SALT cap is as though the federal government
were asserting that anyone not taking the
standard deduction or subject to the AMT should
be credited with no more than $10,000 in taxes not
levied to pay for a direct benefit. The problem
here is that this articulation reveals the
arbitrariness of the new SALT deduction cap, as
judged by income tax principles.
By contrast, imagine that the federal limit had
instead been set so that the federal deduction
would be limited to 50 percent of taxes paid, with
6
no cap. This change would also have been
unpopular with many states, but such a change —
because it is better aligned with income tax theory
— would also have thrown less of a wrench in the
tax system of many states.
Therefore, replacing the cap with an
uncapped, percentage-limited deduction is one
plausible option for future reform. A related
alternative for future reform would be to permit a
deduction for state — but not local — taxes, on the
theory that local taxes more closely resemble a
7
price paid for a particular bundle of goods.
Approach Two:
Stabilize State and Local Revenues
The federal SALT deduction cap primarily
affects taxpayers who pay much more than
$10,000 in state taxes. Looked at from this
perspective, the new federal SALT deduction cap
can arguably be viewed as specifically targeting
states with both progressive income taxes and
especially wealthy taxpayers — as this is what
results in there being many taxpayers who pay
much more than $10,000. Naturally, those states
are upset with the new federal SALT deduction
cap. But might the new cap nevertheless be
justified as something more than representing
dislike of progressive taxes or the states that levy

6

For a more involved version of this argument, see Daniel Hemel,
“Easy on the SALT: A Qualified Defense of the Deduction for State and
Local Taxes,” University of Chicago — Law School, Oct. 28, 2017.
7

Gladriel Shobe, Disaggregating the State and Local Tax Deduction,
35 Virginia Tax Review 327 (2016).
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them? One possible justification is based on the
fact that progressive tax bases tend to be more
volatile, and that the federal government has
8
reason to want to reduce this fiscal volatility.
However, the federal SALT deduction cap is a
very crude instrument for accomplishing this
goal. First, many of the taxes implicated are local
property taxes, which are the most stable in the
9
state and local arsenal. If there is a concern with
progressive income taxes and their volatility, then
why cap property taxes?
Second, and more profoundly, the federal
government has not reduced the fiscal burden on
states and, if anything, has acted — and
attempted to act — to dramatically increase that
burden. Disfavoring a key element of many states’
revenue systems while increasing demands on
those systems is a perverse attempt at limiting the
harms from fiscal volatility.
Approach Three:
Improve Operation of the Overall Tax System
Perhaps the federal government does not care
about state revenue stability and just thinks —
with some justification — that high subnational
personal income taxes are not a good idea. For
instance, the federal government might believe
that high state personal income taxes layered on
top of federal personal income taxes cause
taxpayers to engage in exponentially greater
distortive behavior to avoid those taxes.
Yet capping the SALT deduction is, again, a
very crude attempt to accomplish such a goal.
First, as we have demonstrated elsewhere, the
amount of distortion caused by state corporate
income taxes is potentially much greater than that
10
caused by state personal income taxes. More
specifically, the distortion caused by the ordinary
income component of state personal income taxes
is relatively small compared with the distortions
stemming from state capital gains taxes and

8

See Stark supra note 1; David Gamage, “Preventing State Budget
Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem,” 98 California Law
Review 749 (2010); and Darien Shanske, “How Less Can Be More: Using
the Federal Income Tax to Stabilize State and Local Finance,” 31 Virginia
Tax Review 413 (2012).
9

See Shanske supra at 426-29.

10

Gamage and Shanske, Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in
the United States, 111 Northwestern University Law Review 295, 309-34
(2017).
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11

corporate income taxes. Thus, this rationale
provides little justification for capping state-level
ordinary income tax payments. Even more
perversely, the continued deductibility of
corporate income taxes means that the amended
SALT deduction actually encourages states to rely
more on a form of taxation that increases
distortion.
If the federal government were really
concerned about improving the overall
functioning of the system of raising revenue,
the clear prescription would be for it to adopt a
credit-invoice VAT that the states could
12
piggyback on. The primary hold up here seems
to be purely political, which resulted in last
year’s consideration of the destination-based
cash flow tax. The designers of this complicated
new tax were clear that it was intended to (in
part) tax consumption like a VAT.13 So why not
just impose a well-understood tax used in
virtually every other country on earth?
Approach Four:
Make the Federal Tax System More Progressive
As an itemized deduction, the SALT
deduction disproportionately benefits
wealthier taxpayers. Capping the deduction
was therefore one of the more progressive
components of an otherwise regressive
legislative package. Of course, the package’s
overall regressivity rules out progressivity as
the reason the SALT deduction was capped, but
this argument could motivate a future Congress
and is certainly a legitimate consideration.
Thus, capping the SALT deduction has the
curious impact of making the federal system
more progressive while putting lots of pressure
on the states to be less progressive.
A more straightforward — if expensive —
way to make the SALT deduction more
progressive would be to expand its availability
by making it into a credit or an above-the-line
deduction (perhaps along with limiting the
deduction or credit to only a percentage of taxes

14

paid). This approach could encourage
federalism by making state and local taxes less
costly for a wider swath of taxpayers, which is
another value that a future Congress could
choose to encourage.
Conclusion
To review, here is a set of theoretically
coherent, defensible, and some even mutually
consistent approaches that the federal
government could have taken — and may yet take
— to reform the SALT deduction:
1. On income tax principles, make the
deduction an uncapped percentage of
state and local taxes paid.
2. To advance state revenue stability, make
more stable state and local levies
(especially property taxes) more
deductible.
3. To improve the efficiency of the federal
and state tax systems, the federal
government could implement a national
credit-invoice VAT that the states could
supplement, thereby allowing states to
abandon their much less efficient retail
sales taxes. Reducing the SALT deduction
could be used as a stick to get states to
replace their less efficient taxes with more
efficient alternatives.
4. To improve the efficiency of the federal
and state tax systems, the federal
government could discourage corporate
income taxes in particular.
5. To make the SALT deduction more
progressive and to reduce taxes for all
state and local taxpayers, the federal
government could make some portion of
the SALT deduction an above-the-line
deduction or a credit.


11

Id.

14

12

Id. at 363.

13

Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, Michael Keen, John Vella,
“Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation,” at *4, Oxford University
Centre for Business Taxation (Feb. 6, 2017).

For example, in 2008-10, Congress permitted up to $1,000 (joint
return) in property taxes to be deducted “above the line.” For some
credit options, see Frank Sammartino and Kim Rueben, “Revisiting the
State and Local Tax Deduction,” Tax Policy Center, Urban Institute &
Brookings Institution, Mar. 31, 2016.
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